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A New Strategy for Reducing Selection Bias in Non-Experimental Evaluations,  
and The Case of How Public Assistance Receipt Affects Charitable Giving 
 
 
Abstract 
Prior work has analyzed the extent to which welfare recipients engage in giving money and time 
to charitable causes (Brooks, 2002, 2004; Author4 & Author1, 2009; Author1 & Author4, 2011), 
finding that public assistance is negatively associated with donating money with the relationship 
to volunteering being unclear.  Nevertheless, sticky issues of selection bias compel more 
deliberate thinking about the strength of assertions about cause and effect.  In response, we now 
conduct a multivariate cluster-based subgroup analysis approach to more confidently infer 
causality about the ways in which welfare receipt affects charitable activity.  This approach to 
dealing with the problem of selection bias capitalizes on the known treatment-associated 
variance in the X matrix, transforming data to estimate unbiased treatment effects.  We 
contribute to both the substantive and methodological literatures with this work. 
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A New Strategy for Reducing Selection Bias in Non-Experimental Evaluations,  
and The Case of How Public Assistance Receipt Affects Charitable Giving 
 
 
 Much scholarship is dedicated to understanding the factors that compel one to donate 
time or money to charitable causes; but only a small portion of that scholarship considers those 
within society are least able to make those contributions.  Public opinion data shows that those 
who receive public assistance or are poor share the same values as the rest of society; and so on 
the face of it, there is no reason to believe they might behave differently in terms of their interest 
in volunteering their time or donating their money.  Nevertheless, income is a major constraint 
on one’s ability to donate money or time to charity, and it is income that public assistance 
recipients and other poor segments of our population lack.  Some research on charitable activity 
among public assistance recipients suggests that welfare receipt tends to reduce the levels of 
charitable giving (e.g., Brooks, 2002; 2004); but more recent work shows that this reduction 
might be offset by relatively higher levels of volunteering, all else equal (Author4 & Author1, 
2009).  One of the main challenges in this research is selection bias.  That is, those who use 
welfare are different – in ways that affect their outcomes of interest – from those otherwise, 
seemingly comparable individuals who do not use welfare, and this selection mechanism is not 
well understood or modeled with the kind of data commonly available. 
 Building on prior work, this paper adds to the small literature on how public assistance 
might influence recipients’ charitable activity.  We explore the issues of public assistance 
recipients’ donations of their time and (quite limited) money for charitable purposes.  We use the 
1994-2005 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), along with 2005 wave of the 
Center on Philanthropy’s Panel Study (COPPS), a PSID module that includes data on charitable 
giving and volunteering.  Importantly, we also use this question to test a new analytic approach 
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to overcoming selection bias and hope this has useful methodological lessons for program 
evaluators and policy analysts. 
 This paper is organized into four sections.  We begin with background discussion both of 
the effects of earned and public assistance income on people’s charitable behaviors.  We then 
discuss the data and methods, including the issues of selection bias problem that challenge this 
research and proposing a new analytic method that minimizes selection bias in impacts estimates.  
The third section presents results of our data analysis and discusses the findings.  We conclude 
with a discussion of the contributions and limitations of the study, as well as research and policy 
implications. 
 
Background 
 Prior research examines a variety of factors associated with individuals’ donations of 
money and time.  Here we discuss findings from that research, in particular what we know about 
the relationships between public assistance use, as well as demographic traits, and charitable 
activity. 
 
Charitable Activity and its Correlates  
 Several key personal characteristics are associated with charitable activity.  As we have 
discussed in contextualizing prior work (Author4 & Author1, 2009; Author1 & Author4, 2011), 
research documents that age may be “the variable most consistently related to giving” (Clotfelter, 
1997, 17), with donations increasing with one’s age (e.g., Arai, 2004; Brooks, 2002; Van Slyke 
& Brooks, 2005; Wilson and Musik, 1997).  Age may be related to volunteering in a curvilinear 
fashion due to physical infirmity among the elderly. Campbell and Yonish (2003) note that 
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“while there is a generally monotonic increase in volunteering as someone ages, volunteering 
falls off sharply for the elderly as they become less physically able to perform volunteer work” 
(n14, p.233).  Education is also consistently and positively correlated with charitable giving (e.g., 
Feldstein & Clotfelter, 1976; Jencks, 1987; Morgan, Dye & Hybels, 1977; Van Slyke & Brooks, 
2005; Steinberg & Wilhelm, 2003) and volunteering (Choi, 2003; McPherson & Rotolo, 1996).  
Marital status, in contrast, has a less clear association with charitable giving, but research shows 
that it matters.  Some have found a positive relationship (e.g., Andreoni, Brown & Rischall, 
2003; Choi, 2003; Jencks, 1987; Rooney et al., 2005; Van Slyke & Brooks, 2005; Wilson, 2000), 
explained by the added resources and social connections that marriage brings; but others have 
found no difference in the volunteering that married and unmarried people do, controlling for 
other factors (Fischer et al., 1991; Herzog & Morgan, 1993; Musick & Wilson, 2008).  Another 
clear link exists between religious affiliation and practice and charitable activity (Wilson & 
Musick, 1997), with being Christian (e.g., Van Slyke & Brooks, 2005) and more frequent service 
attendance (e.g., Steinberg & Wilhelm, 2003) being associated with greater giving of both time 
and money.  Health status also influences volunteer activity, with poor health reducing both 
one’s ability to volunteer (Caputo 1997) and the amount of time one volunteers (Gallagher, 
1994; Wilson & Musick, 1997), particularly among older adults (Choi, 2003).  Some research 
finds that race and ethnicity affect charitable activity, with African American and Hispanic 
families being less likely to donate or volunteer, or to donate less money or fewer hours, than 
Whites (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1996); but others find no effect (e.g., O’Neill & Roberts, 
2000; Rooney et al., 2005; Steinberg & Wilhelm, 2005).   
 In addition to these personal traits, two other correlates of charitable activity demand 
attention:  income, and public policy.  Substantial research has considered the impact of public 
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policy on charitable giving (Brooks, 2000; Steinberg, 1990; Steinberg, 1993).  Relevant policies 
include personal tax deductions for charitable donations and the tax exempt status of various 
investments.  The policy most relevant to this analysis for instance is tax deduction itemizing. 
Another arena of policy is public assistance, which this project considers, and its role in 
inhibiting or encouraging charitable activity.  This arena is much less studied, with our recent 
work (Author4 & Author1, 2009; Author1 & Author4, 2011) and that of Brooks (2004, 2002) 
being the most direct tests of policy effects.   
 As we describe elsewhere (Author4 & Author1, 2009; Author1 & Author4, 2011), 
Brooks (2002, 2004) finds that welfare receipt negatively impacts charity, suggesting that 
welfare income functions differently from earned income in stimulating charitable activity.  
Notwithstanding their contribution to our understanding of the charitable activities of welfare 
recipients, existing studies neglect one key dimension: volunteering.  This omission is important 
because, as Brooks (2002) notes, contributions by the poor “might be especially likely to take a 
non-pecuniary form” (111).  In light of the negative effect of welfare receipt on charitable giving 
documented in the literature, the question arises:  would public assistance use have a similar, 
negative influence on recipients’ likelihood to volunteer?  Such a negative effect would be 
consistent with the notion of a “culture of welfare,” which suggests that long-term welfare 
dependency may suppress many pro-social attitudes (Brooks, 2002).  It also echoes the 
proposition that “welfare benefits discourage political involvement by cultivating personal traits 
of dependence” (Soss, 1999, 363).    
 Alternatively, receiving public assistance might have a positive effect on recipients’ 
likelihood to volunteer.  That is, government assistance might encourage beneficiaries to become 
more civically engaged.  Mettler (2002), for example, finds that the G.I. Bill’s educational 
 6 
provisions lead to increased levels of voluntary participation by veterans (in the form of 
memberships in civic organizations and political activity).  A positive association between public 
assistance receipt and volunteering may also be interpreted from the perspective of human 
capital and career development (e.g., Menchik & Weisbrod, 1987).  Combined with job search 
(or other traditional welfare-to-work activities), volunteering can help public assistance 
recipients gain economic independence by building their confidence and the motivation 
necessary to succeed in regular employment and by providing opportunities for learning specific 
work-related skills (Herr, Wagner & Halpern, 1996).  In addition, public assistance recipients 
can also benefit from the signaling effect of volunteering: their volunteer experience can signal 
to future employers the presence of certain skills or abilities (Schiff, 1990; Ziemek, 2006). 
 The effect of public assistance receipt on charitable activity can also be understood by 
considering whether giving and volunteering are complements or substitutes.  On one hand, the 
Independent Sector’s research on giving and volunteering reveals a positive correlation between 
these two types of individual philanthropy (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1996).  Van Slyke and 
Brooks (2005) also find that individuals who volunteer for charitable organizations, regardless of 
their demographic attributes, are more likely to donate money as well.   They reason that 
volunteers donate money out of a sense of community.  Following this line of reasoning, then, 
government support for those who are in need might discourage their volunteer activities if 
assistance negatively affects their giving behavior.  Although no existing evidence supports this 
possibility, research finds that giving and volunteering both increase when tax policy 
encouraging giving is implemented, and that they both decrease when tax policy discouraging 
giving is in place (e.g., Andreoni et al., 1996; Brown, 1999).   
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 On the other hand, a standard economic model of constrained utility maximization would 
predict that giving and volunteering function as substitutes for each other (Slyke & Brooks, 
2005).  This is consistent with the work of Jencks (1987) and Duncan (1999), who find that when 
an individual’s likelihood to give money declines, his or her contribution of time increases, on 
average.  Following this line of reasoning, we might hypothesize that public assistance receipt 
would increase volunteerism.  Although the relationship between public assistance receipt and 
giving is negative, the relationship between public assistance receipt and volunteering could well 
be positive:  relying on public assistance reflects a severe income constraint that may rule out 
charitable giving, but, if giving and volunteering are substitutes, then volunteering would be 
more likely.  Stated differently, it is possible that a public assistance recipient’s diminished 
financial contributions might be off-set by an increase in the amount of time donated.  Prior work 
suggests that this may be the case (Author4 & Author1, 2009). 
 Beyond the discussion of giving and volunteering as complements or substitutes, one 
might consider the effect of public assistance use on charitable activity in terms of the distinction 
between luxury and necessity goods.  Luxury goods are goods whose income elasticity of 
demand exceeds one, whereas necessity goods are those whose income elasticity of demand is 
below one.  As income rises, the proportion of expenditure on luxury goods increases while that 
on necessity goods decreases (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980).  It is plausible that gifts of money 
are luxury goods among people with low incomes.  Gifts of time, on the other hand, are necessity 
goods.  For low-income people such as welfare recipients, therefore, the “giving mix” is mostly 
in the form of time, but the mixture shifts towards money as income increases. 
In light of this discussion, we propose to examine two competing hypotheses regarding 
the effect of public assistance receipt on charitable giving and volunteering.  One hypothesis is 
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that public assistance receipt has a negative effect on charitable giving, but has a positive effect 
on volunteering.  The competing hypothesis is that public assistance receipt has a negative effect 
on both charitable giving and volunteering.   
 Research Question.  The question that this motivates is: How does public assistance 
receipt affect charitable giving?  As noted, prior work examined two dimensions of charitable 
giving:  donations of time and money.  We revisit that same question here by extending a new 
methodological approach to increase our confidence in the causal story. 
 
Methodology 
 This section details our data source, measures and the analytic approach we follow to 
answer the question. 
 
Data and Measures 
 Our analysis uses the 2005 Center on Philanthropy Panel Study supplement to the PSID.  
In particular, we merge variables from the 1994-2005 panels of the PSID to the 2005 COPPS 
supplement.  The COPPS collects data on the amount of money and number of hours donated to 
several charitable purposes:  religious, combined funds, basic needs, health, education, youth and 
family services, the arts, neighborhoods, the environment, and international aid.  In addition to 
these key indicators, the dataset contains information about households characteristics and use of 
various forms of public assistance.  Our sample in particular is the 7,822 households that 
comprise the 2005 COPPS. 
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Measures 
 As elaborated in Author4 and Author1 (2009), from the raw COPPS data, we compute 
two dependent variables:  the Amount Donated and the Hours Volunteered.  The amount donated 
is simply the sum of households’ contributions made in 2004 to a variety of charitable sources 
and is measured in dollars.
1
  Likewise, the number of hours volunteered is the sum of the head of 
households’ time donated to a variety of charitable organizations in 2002.2  Our descriptive 
statistics include binary versions of these variables as well as the percent of the population that 
donates money or time at all. 
 Our specific measures of income combine specific sources of 2004 household income as 
reported by survey respondents.  Earned Income is the sum of the household head and spouse’s 
labor income (e.g., wage, salaries, etc.).  Public Assistance Income is the sum of the household 
head and spouse income from cash public assistance (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
[TANF]), general assistance (GA), and food stamps.  Both income variables are converted to 
reflect annual amounts.  Although the scant prior research on public assistance use and charitable 
activity has focused on cash assistance in particular, we feel justified in using a broader 
conception of public assistance.  There is substantial overlap between cash assistance and food 
stamps use.  While some individuals receive only food stamps and not cash assistance, they may 
still be considered as somewhat reliant on the state for support.  Including food stamp recipients 
also increases the number of members in the treatment subsample, thereby increasing our ability 
to detect effects, if they exist.  
                                                 
1
 Here we use the COPPS definition of charitable giving as donations of $25 or more made to charitable 
organizations.  Since there is not a “total amount donated” variable in the COPPS data, we construct this variable by 
adding religious giving to all secular giving.  For the few households who answered the unfolding brackets questions 
(e.g., “Did you make any donations specifically for religious purposes”, etc.) rather than the amount given question, 
this variable is coded to the lower bound based on the brackets.   
2
 Since there is not a “total hours volunteered” variable in the COPPS data, we construct this variable by adding 
hours volunteered to religious organizations to hours volunteered to secular organizations.   
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Next, we compute three additional public assistance variables.  Prior Public Assistance 
Receipt identifies the number of years between 1993 and 2002 (with a total of seven possible) 
that a household had income from cash public assistance (TANF and GA) or food stamps.  
Similarly, we report the number of years of Prior Public Housing Residence between 1993 and 
2002; and we report Current Public Housing Residence as whether the household reports living 
in public housing in 2004.  We include these public housing variables as a way to control for 
other measures of disadvantage that might be associated with both public assistance use and the 
ability to donate one’s money or time to charitable causes.   
 In order to capture the possible effect of the price of giving (i.e., marginal income tax 
rates), we include a binary variable, Tax Itemizer, which equals 1 if the household head itemized 
deductions in his or her tax return (and 0 otherwise).  While the price of giving one dollar to 
charity is one dollar for taxpayers who do not itemize deductions in their tax returns, for 
itemizers the price of giving is less than a dollar, as they receive a “rebate” equal in value to their 
deductible contributions times the applicable marginal tax rate.     
 The general household characteristics are straightforward and capture the traits that prior 
research identifies as associated with charitable activity:  age, sex, number of children, marital 
status, race, ethnicity, education, religiosity, urban residence, and health status.  Our unit of 
analysis is the head of household, and some characteristics of the household more broadly are 
associated with those individuals.  Table 1 presents the variable definitions and summary 
statistics for the overall sample, as well as for the overall subgroups of those who we consider to 
be welfare recipients and non-recipients.  
 11 
Table 1. Variable Names, Labels and Descriptive Characteristics (weighted) 
Variable label Overall Welfare Rs Non-Rs 
Charity Variables 
Donated at all 
Volunteered at all  
Amount donated ($) 
Hours volunteered 
66.9 
28.5 
$1,418 
48.3 
% 
% 
 
 
29.2 
13.8 
$159 
29.9  
69.8 
29.6 
$1,515 
49.7 
** 
** 
** 
** 
Income Variables 
Earned income  
Public assistance income 
Tax itemizer 
$47,822 
$160 
42.4 % 
$10,288 
$2,221 
6.5  
$50,712 
0 
45.1 
** 
** 
** 
Public Assistance Use Variables 
Prior public assistance use (%) 
Prior public assistance use (yrs) 
Current public housing residence (%) 
Prior public housing residence (yrs) 
11.2 
0.28 
3.4 
0.13 
% 
 
% 
 
58.2 
1.9 
15.0 
0.57  
7.6 
0.2 
2.5 
0.10 
** 
** 
** 
** 
Household Characteristics  
Age of head (yrs) 
Sex of head (female) 
Number of children 
Marital status (married) 
African American 
Hispanic 
Education (<=high school) 
Education  (yrs completed) 
49.4 
29.2 
0.6 
50.2 
14.1 
7.1 
49.3 
17.4 
% 
 
% 
% 
% 
% 
 
42.1 
60.0 
1.3 
21.4 
42.2 
13.3 
76.7 
14.8  
49.9 
26.9 
0.5 
52.4 
12.0 
6.6 
47.2 
17.6 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
Catholic 
Jewish 
Protestant
 
24.0 
3.4 
57.9 
% 
% 
% 
17.1 
0.0 
66.0  
24.5 
3.6 
57.3 
** 
** 
** 
Rural location (1-10 scale) 
Good health (1-5 scale) 
3.5 
3.5  
3.5 
3.5  
3.8 
2.9 
* 
** 
Number of observations 7,822  891  6,931  
Notes: 
** statistically significant difference; p<0.05   
* statistically significant difference; p<0.10 
 
 As Table 1 shows, major differences exist in the characteristics of those who are public 
assistance recipients and those who are not.  For example, in terms of our dependent variables of 
interest, welfare recipients donate less money and less time to charitable causes.  As expected, 
they also have much less income from work, are younger, are less white, and are more likely to 
have a female household head.  These differences are statistically significant, are generally large 
in magnitude, and very likely contribute to important differences in their outcomes.  This table 
reports only the descriptive characteristics, but controlling for between-group differences is 
essential to understanding whether, given these differences, welfare recipients are more or less 
generous with their time or limited money, when it comes to acting charitably.  For this reason, 
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we spend some time in the next section considering how to deal with the bias that this would 
undoubtedly influence any estimate of the impact of public assistance receipt on charitable 
activity. 
 
Analytic Methods 
 Both dependent measures are continuous, are truncated at zero, and include relatively 
large numbers of observed zeroes.  Prior research has shown that charitable giving data may have 
a non-normal and heteroskedastic error structure (Rooney, Steinberg & Schervish, 2001, 2004; 
Steinberg, Rooney & Chin, 2002).  Under these circumstances, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression coefficients are biased and inconsistent.  In line with much of the literature on 
charitable giving, we estimate our models using Tobit, a censored regression technique (Brooks, 
2002; Van Slyke & Brooks, 2005).
3
   
 With this functional form, our prior work has used a difference-in-difference strategy and 
propensity score matching (Author1 & Author4, 2011) to reduce the amount of bias in our 
impact estimates that derived from selection processes, primarily due to the selection process 
associated with welfare use.  While we stand behind that approach and our prior work, at the 
very least for the transparency of the approach, we believe it is important to re-test our results 
using different methods, both as a robustness check and to advance research methods used in 
examining policy effects. 
 In turn, this paper uses an atheoretical approach that we propose minimizes bias from 
selection.  The analysis clusters cases as similar; and within each cluster the comparison of 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted that, while Tobit accommodates the large number of zeroes in the dependent variable, it is not 
robust to either non-normality or heteroskedasiticity.  However, a recent study by Wilhelm (2006) provides support 
for using Tobit with this particular data, arguing that despite rejection of the underlying assumptions of Tobit at 
higher levels of statistical significance, the Tobit estimates are numerically close to more robust methods.   
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welfare and non-welfare users generates an estimate of impact with minimal bias from selection.  
Two features of our analysis are especially unique, as previously described in Author2 (2009) 
and Author2 and Author3 (2010) and applied in Author1, Author3 and Author2 (2009).  The first 
distinct feature is our use of cluster analysis, specifically incorporating data transformed through 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA).  The MCA creates a data structure that eliminates 
variance in the X matrix that is associated with treatment assignment, and the cluster analysis 
enhances the possibility of finding local spaces in which variables are balanced.   
The second feature – the measure of Global Imbalance – is a single measure of the 
balance in data and is based on the concept of inertia as a measure of dependence between 
categorical covariates and the treatment assignment indicator.  Whereas common practice is to 
assess variable-by-variable the extent to which comparison and treatment groups are matched, 
the GI measure allows an overall assessment of how well-matched cases are.  For example, while 
Table 1 considers one-by-one the differences between the two groups, the GI measure assesses 
the comparability between groups, taking into account variation in all baseline covariates 
simultaneously.  This is particularly useful in our case because we expect to examine many 
subsets of matched treatment and comparison cases, and a variable-by-variable assessment of 
their balance is likely not only to be tedious but also to reveal differences that exist purely by 
chance, some of which may be real and others of which may be only random, the distinction 
between which is un-knowable. Appendix A details the technical aspects of the GI measure and 
its test of statistical significance. 
In brief, we use a three-step approach for estimating unbiased treatment effects in non-
experimental data, as follows: 
1. Measure and test balance: compute GI measure on the whole sample and test its statistical 
significance.  
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2. If imbalance exists (which is probable in all non-experimental data), perform a subgroup 
analysis, which involves the following: 
 Use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to obtain a continuous and a low-
dimensional representation of the X-space. 
 Enter the MCA coordinates into a cluster analysis to identify homogeneous groups. 
3. Measure and test balance within each cluster, and compute local treatment effects within 
balanced clusters, pruning observations in unbalanced clusters. 
Intuitively, when data are not balanced, a transition from the global predictor space to local 
predictor spaces is done by means of cluster analysis in order to estimate unbiased treatment 
effects.  This approach can be considered a subgroup analysis where the primary goal is to get a 
cluster partition that generates balanced groups, thereby minimizing selection bias and 
generating unbiased impact estimates. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 This section reports on the results from each of the three steps described above, and then 
presents findings from this process, comparing them to results from our prior work and then 
discussing implications. 
 Step 1.  In implementing the three-step analysis, we begin by computing the GI measure 
for the entire sample.  As reported in Table 2, the resulting value of 0.0406 can be interpreted as 
demonstrating the presence of imbalance in data.  This is not surprising given the obvious 
differences revealed in Table 1.  The GI measure falls in the critical region, thereby demanding 
data adjustment in order to estimate treatment effects not biased by selection.  Essentially, Table 
2 reports a single measure of sample balance; whereas Table 1 identified the variable-by-variable 
differences in sample characteristics.  
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Table 2. Balance in the Overall Sample 
Treatment Comparison GI Interval balance 
891 6,931 0.0406 (0;0.0006) no 
 
 Step 2.  The second step involves cluster analysis to identify homogeneous groups on the 
basis of MCA coordinates.  The MCA was carried out using the following variables:  age of 
head, sex of head, number of children, age of youngest child, African-American, Hispanic, 
marital status, education, single female, years of school completed, rural location, health of head, 
work status (working, retired, disabled), head hours worked, spouse hours worked, earned 
income, prior public assistance use, current and prior public housing residence.   
The result of the MCA is a set of new variables (factorial coordinates) that are continuous 
and orthogonal one other.  On the basis of these new MCA coordinates, we perform a cluster 
analysis to generate homogeneous groups.  Although cluster analysis is an atheoretical approach, 
the variables we enter in to this preceding MCA regardless have theoretically justification as 
useful predictors of public assistance receipt.  While others have used cluster analysis to 
understand how various treated subgroups are impacted (e.g., Author1, 2005; Yoshikawa, 
Rosman, & Hsueh, 2001), what makes this approach different is both (1) the MCA that 
transforms the data to minimize bias in cluster-based treatment-comparison group impact 
analyses, and (2) the introduction of the GI measure to conclude if a particular cluster has 
balanced treatment-comparison cases.  In previous research (Author1, Author3, & Author2, 
2009), we used a Ward algorithm on the MCA coordinates to generate clusters.  Here, the sample 
size is greater than 5,000 units and therefore requires substantial computational resources to 
perform the distance matrix computation.  To overcome this computational challenge, we use a 
mixed clustering method (Lebart et al., 1984), a combination of clustering around moving 
 16 
centers  and Ward’s hierarchical aggregation of stable groups, which is the best adapted to large 
datasets.  We use the SAS software for MCA and cluster analysis.  
 The result of the mixed clustering method is depicted on a dendrogram, a tree diagram 
used to document the clustering process.  Based on the dendrogram’s structure, we mostly 
closely examine the 8-, 13-, 19-, 24-, 31- and 40-cluster solutions.  We retain the 40-cluster 
solution because it provides balance within a suitable number of clusters, compared with other 
examined cluster solutions.  With the 40-cluster solution, we measure and test balance within 
each group, using the GI measure, which is a clear advantage over the more traditional variable-
by-variable assessment of group similarity.  
 Table 3 shows the results of this cluster analysis in terms of balance, including the 
number of treatment and comparison cases that each cluster includes.  In this illustration, 13 of 
the clusters result in having unbalanced characteristics by our GI measure.  In total, they 
represent about 35.7 percent of the observations of the original sample, which are then excluded 
from our third analytic step.  Compared to a more commonly-used propensity score matching 
approach (e.g., Author1 & Author4, 2011), this cluster-based approach retains much more of the 
sample. 
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Table 3. Balance by Clusters, 40-Cluster Solution 
Cluster Comparison Treatment GI Interval Balance 
1 801 5 0.003 (0;0.004) Yes 
2 250 14 0.024 (0;0.015) No 
3 446 8 0.006 (0;0.007) yes 
4 250 9 0.017 (0;0.017) yes 
5 111 3 0.025 (0;0.030) yes 
6 40 2 0.072 (0;0.073) yes 
7 91 10 0.022 (0;0.034) yes 
8 31 3 0.065 (0;0.102) yes 
9 171 3 0.024 (0;0.021) no 
10 97 6 0.028 (0;0.033) yes 
11 68 26 0.040 (0;0.042) yes 
12 137 10 0.035 (0;0.025) no 
13 133 4 0.058 (0;0.027) no 
14 309 29 0.010 (0;0.010) yes 
15 119 43 0.036 (0;0.026) no 
16 169 8 0.014 (0;0.019) yes 
17 138 10 0.036 (0;0.022) no 
18 263 14 0.015 (0;0.015) yes 
19 218 19 0.010 (0;0.014) yes 
20 427 9 0.009 (0;0.009) yes 
21 59 15 0.022 (0;0.048) yes 
22 288 20 0.017 (0;0.012) no 
23 63 10 0.018 (0;0.050) yes 
24 70 11 0.030 (0;0.042) yes 
25 195 25 0.027 (0;0.015) no 
26 85 99 0.020 (0;0.020) yes 
27 130 36 0.035 (0;0.019) no 
28 139 12 0.023 (0;0.025) yes 
29 366 17 0.009 (0;0.009) yes 
30 258 78 0.020 (0;0.010) No 
31 45 24 0.038 (0;0.059) Yes 
32 63 33 0.039 (0;0.039) Yes 
33 11 12 0.070 (0;0.161) Yes 
34 43 43 0.033 (0;0.046) Yes 
35 75 118 0.024 (0;0.021) Yes 
36 123 12 0.034 (0;0.028) No 
37 13 38 0.044 (0;0.068) Yes 
38 59 38 0.021 (0;0.039) Yes 
39 243 14 0.016 (0;0.013) no 
40 334 2 0.023 (0;0.011) no 
Notes: GI refers to the measure of global imbalance, which assesses holistically whether within-cluster treatment 
and comparison cases are balanced (similar) or imbalanced (dissimilar). 
 
 Step 3.  During the final stage of the procedure, we analyze the effects of public 
assistance receipt on two outcomes of interest, the amount donated to charity and the number of 
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hours volunteering within each of the remaining 27 balanced clusters.  We estimate our giving 
and volunteering models by cluster, fitting a Tobit model (Verbeek, 2008) as follows: 
iii wy  
*
            i =1,2,…,N 
0 y  if     0y
0  y  if   yy
*
ii
*
i
*
ii


             
 where  
  y is the outcome of interest (dollars donated or hours volunteered),  
  w is a vector of indicators of charitable activity,  
    is a random disturbance term, assumed to be  2,0 NID  and independent from   
                         iw , and 
  
  the subscript i indexes individuals.  
Using the SAS qlim procedure, we fit a Tobit model for each cluster to estimate the effect 
of public assistance use on the outcome of interest.  At this point, we do not include any 
additional variables in the model, at least in part because the number of observations of either 
treatment or comparison group members is sometimes smaller than the number of explanatory 
variables we would include.  Instead, we perform a single regression within each of the 27 
balanced clusters, under the presumption that they include well-matched treatment and 
comparison group members on the basis of the GI measure and test’s result within clusters; and, 
while heterogeneous, their selection as cluster-matched cases means that, on aggregate, they 
should also retain the properties of supporting solid internal validity. 
 Because Tobit coefficients are not directly interpretable, we also compute and report 
marginal effects (Greene, 1999) to judge the magnitude and importance of estimated effects.  
The marginal effect represents the instantaneous effect that a change in a certain variable has on 
the dependent variable while keeping all the other covariates constant. 
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 Our main findings appear in Table 4, which summarizes the Tobit regression results 
along with the computed marginal effects of receiving public assistance on the amount of money 
donated and on the number of hours volunteered.  Considering the dependent variable of the 
amount of money donated, among these 27 balanced clusters, five show a positive effect of 
welfare receipt on donations and the remaining 22 show a negative effect.  None of the positive 
effects are statistically significant.  Fourteen of the negative effects are statistically significant; 
and among those, just five are in clusters where we have sufficient sample size to be confident of 
the results.  The magnitude of the effect between the treatment and comparison group members 
in Cluster 18, for example, would be interpreted as follows:  holding all other variables constant 
at the mean, being a public assistance recipient is associated with making $1,052 less in 
charitable contributions relative to those who do not receive assistance. 
 20 
Table 4.  The Effect of Public Assistance Use on Charitable Activity, by Balanced Cluster 
Cluster 
Amount of Money Donated Number of Hours Volunteered 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Marginal 
Effect P-value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Marginal 
Effect P-value 
1^ -2,321.1  -1,583.36  <0.01 ** -226.0  -83.1  0.26  
3^  -1,254.9  -816.94  <0.01 ** -171.7  -49.1  0.36  
4^ -2,062.2  -1,254.06  <0.01 ** -122.2  -34.0  0.43  
5^ -3,894.6  -2,240.43  <0.01 ** -769.6  -209.3  <0.01 ** 
6^ -1,358.1  -751.48  <0.01 ** 93.1  20.9  0.72  
7 -784.7  -370.96  0.35  -295.1  -99.3  0.13  
8^ -11,939.0  -4,000.14  <0.01 ** -1,651.3  -327.1  <0.01 ** 
10^ -2,485.0  -1,137.76  <0.01 ** 247.1  43.5  0.16  
11 -164,453.0  -510.47  0.03 ** -55.0  -8.6  0.64  
14 -1,022.4  -454.91  0.13  -141.6  -30.5  0.44  
16^ -5,101.0  -2,459.59  <0.01 ** 437.9  100.6  0.03 ** 
18 -1,961.0  -1,052.91  <0.01 ** -176.9  -40.8  0.36  
19 -638.4  -256.03  0.34  -122.6  -19.2  0.52  
20^ -1,795.9  -1,055.62  <0.01 ** -58.1  -14.4  0.69  
21 -1,081.9  -406.93  0.17  -59.6  -9.9  0.82  
23 498.6  82.96  0.32  68.9  6.7  0.31  
24 443.9  153.90  0.41  -37.9  -8.1  0.58  
26 14.3  3.32  0.98  -106.8  -25.8  0.56  
28 -1,456.6  -779.13  0.01 ** -51.5  -10.9  0.59  
29 -1,357.4  -808.69  0.17  -23.9  -9.3  0.82  
31 -113.3  -39.78  0.78  14.4  2.1  0.65  
32 -642.1  -206.03  0.05 ** -231.8  -35.9  0.48  
33 104.6  24.28  0.47  -2,999.6  -437.6  <0.01 ** 
34 -864.0  -186.92  0.10 * -6.0  -0.8  0.98  
35 -138.1  -34.38  0.68  68.8  14.6  0.59  
37 172.2  37.36  0.32  3,422.6  67.9  <0.01 ** 
38 -188.5  -60.85  0.68  -39.3  -3.6  0.72  
Notes: 
^  Although we estimate parameters, we urge caution in interpretation because of low statistical power due to few 
observations for a treatment level. 
The parameter estimate is that associated with the treatment variable, indicating that the sample member received 
welfare.  So, these are interpreted as the effect of receiving welfare on the money and time donations.  No additional 
controls are included. 
**   Statistically significant, p<0.05 
*   Statistically significant, p<0.10 
 
 Next, considering volunteer hours, only two of the five statistically significant results are 
in clusters where we have enough observations to be confident in the results.  That said, those 
two effects operate in opposite directions:  the finding from Cluster 33 suggests that those public 
assistance recipients volunteer many fewer hours (437 per year) than non-recipients; whereas 
those recipients in Cluster 37 volunteer 68 more hours annually than their non-recipient 
counterparts, holding other variables constant. 
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 Each of these individual analyses within cluster is between matched members of the 
treatment group (received public assistance) and the comparison group (did not receive public 
assistance).  In part for the observation that a cluster-by-cluster analysis involves relatively few 
cases within some selected clusters, we are prevented from controlling for other variables that 
might explain charitable activity.  Recall that cluster membership was determined by the MCA 
coordinates, which were based on a theoretical model of public assistance use, and so we assert 
that the treatment and comparison cases within each cluster minimize selection bias related to 
public assistance use; but there may be variability in the data related to charitable activity that we 
could control for in increasing the precision of our estimates of the impact of public assistance 
receipt on charitable activity.  If this is the case, then future analysis might consider collectively 
all of the observations within the balanced clusters in an aggregate analysis that would permit 
more precise estimate of impacts through controlling for other variables. 
 While we undertake this analysis to maximize the internal validity of our findings (that is 
minimize bias in impact estimates), we also remain concerned with the external validity.  That is, 
our process resulted in some unbalanced clusters, the cases we pruned from subsequent analysis.  
Further, several of the remaining clusters show no effect of having received public assistance on 
either money or time donated to charity.  We might be interested to know the characteristics of 
those whose public assistance receipt has no effect on their charitable activity; and we are also 
likely interested in the characteristics of those clusters in which there is a statistically significant 
effect, at least in part to gauge the extent to which these results might be generalizable. 
   In response, we provide the descriptive characteristics of those clusters in which balance 
between the treatment group (welfare recipients) and comparison group (non-recipients) exists 
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and there is some evidence of a statistically significant effect.  Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present these 
results. 
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics, by Cluster, among Selected Balanced Clusters (with small 
sample size)  
Variable 
Sample 
mean 
Cluster 
1 3 4 5 6 8 10 16 20 
Dollars effect   –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** 
Hours effect   – – – – + –  ** + +  ** – 
Observations  806 454 259 114 42 34 103 177 436 
Treatment  5 8 9 3 2 3 6 8 9 
Comparison  801 446 250 111 40 31 97 169 427 
Age of head 44.7 44.9 43.2 41.3 43.0 36.5 35.6 39.3 45.1 43.0 
Female head (%) 29.5 0.0 1.3 4.6 2.7 0.0 17.6 2.9 1.7 0.0 
# children 0.90 1.04 0.92 0.97 0.83 0.95 1.11 1.16 0.72 1.06 
African-Am. (%) 33.7 13.5 26.6 31.7 9.7 7.1 5.9 25.2 24.3 37.8 
Hispanic (%) 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Married (%) 51.1 91.6 77.3 69.5 73.7 69.1 67.7 68.0 76.3 90.1 
≤high school (%) 31.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 26.5 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Working (%) 75.4 97.8 95.2 93.8 93.9 92.9 91.2 92.2 97.2 97.5 
Retired (%) 10.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.4 2.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Head work hrs 1,696 2,344 2,236 2,194 223 2,141 2,138 2,279 2,225 2,315 
Spouse work hrs  732 1,511 1,154 1,145 1,040 1,276 1,098 1,155 1,193 1,643 
Earned income($) 47,269 8,279 55,791 66,091 51,686 54,852 52,070 53,216 49,817 76,261 
Prior PA (yrs) 0.44 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.06 
Pub. housing (%) 5.13 0.12 1.10 1.93 1.75 2.38 0.00 1.94 0.56 0.69 
Prior housing (yrs) 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.103 
Notes: 
These selected balanced clusters are those marked in Table 1 as having low statistical power due to few observations 
for a treatment level.  We therefore urge caution in interpretation of the effects. 
**   Statistically significant, p<0.05 
*   Statistically significant, p<0.10 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics, by Cluster, among Selected Balanced Clusters (with larger 
sample size)  
Variable 
Sample 
mean 
Cluster 
11 18 28 32 34 37 
Dollars effect   –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** –  ** + 
Hours effect   – – – – – +  ** 
Observations  94 277 151 96 22 51 
Treatment  26 14 12 33 12 38 
Comparison  68 263 139 63 11 13 
Age of head 44.7 38.7 42.8 44.4 41.3 58.3 51.3 
Female head (%) 29.5 78.3 3.3 0.0 99.6 59.1 56.8 
# children 0.90 1.06 0.89 0.80 1.58 1.22 0.56 
African-Am. (%) 33.7 69.2 16.3 55.6 88.5 50.0 78.4 
Hispanic (%) 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 9.1 0.0 
Married (%) 51.1 2.1 72.9 0.0 0.0 36.4 17.7 
≤high school (%) 31.7 36.2 46.2 100.0 43.8 18.2 43.1 
Working (%) 75.4 72.3 93.9 95.4 88.5 4.6 0.0 
Retired (%) 10.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.8 0.0 
Head work hrs 1,696 1,509 2,217 2,028 1,981 156 50 
Spouse work hrs  732 37 1,083 0.0 0.0 195 167 
Earned income($) 47,269 18,254 52,609 36,378 17,915 3,903 1,824 
Prior PA (yrs) 0.44 0.39 0.10 0.32 3.46 3.54 6.01 
Pub. housing (%) 5.13 18.09 0.36 2.65 20.83 18.18 13.73 
Prior housing (yrs) 0.19 0.26 0.06 0.30 1.09 0.86 1.19 
Notes: 
These selected balanced clusters are those marked in Table 1 as having sufficient numbers of observations to instill 
greater confidence in interpretation of the effects. 
**   Statistically significant, p<0.05 
*   Statistically significant, p<0.10 
 
 In brief, it is clear that our clusters represent relatively heterogeneous subgroups of the 
overall sample.  Many dimensions of variation exist, even along just those variables that we have 
measured here.  The consistent effect across most of the clusters (where results are statistically 
significant) is that current public assistance receipt is associated with lower donations to charity.  
This is in line with our prior work, which found that public assistance use itself suppressed 
donations of money, but that as public assistance income rises so too do money donations 
(Author4 & Author1, 2009).  Note, however, that the present analysis does not (yet) consider the 
role of the amount of public assistance income, only public assistance receipt, since the cluster-
by-cluster analysis includes only an unbiased selection-to-welfare (treatment) indicator.  Most of 
the reported effects on volunteer hours are not statistically significant; but, among the three that 
are, two of them are positive effects, which is sync with our prior research and supports the 
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possibility that donations of money and time are substitutes for one another.  Our research here, 
however, suggests that this is not a widespread finding but instead isolated to some specific sub-
populations.  The characteristics of the subgroup represented in cluster 37 suggest that it might 
be classified as “children of the Great Society.”  Specifically, with an average age of 51, this 
somewhat older group was born around 1953, and they are relatively evenly split between men 
and women.  With very low income from work, and a much greater proportion being African 
American, compared to the sample mean,  they have greater connection to public assistance, with 
an average of six years (of the prior seven) as public assistance recipients, and greater 
proportions living in public housing.  Despite these characteristics, this group has greater levels 
of volunteering, perhaps suggesting that their upbringing during the Great Society and Civil 
Rights movements of the sixties is associated with greater evidence of giving back. 
 
Conclusion 
 Prior research has considered the effects of public policy on charitable activity, although 
relatively little of that considers the role of public assistance.  Prior work has aimed to minimize 
problems associated with selection bias in estimating policy impacts, and the current work makes 
another attempt to do so.  Here we apply a creative clustering approach devised and applied in 
Author2 (2009), Author3 and Author2 (2010) and Author1, Author3, and Author2 (2009). 
 Although our prior work made the case for this approach on the basis of it minimizing 
researcher influence over elements of the process, this particular application highlights that this 
objectivity may in fact be somewhat compromised.  Specifically, the choice of algorithm to use 
in cluster analysis can have important implications for analytic results (e.g., Aldenderfer & 
Blashfield, 1984), and here we chose to use a mixed classification method.  It is possible that a 
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different choice at this point in the analysis might have resulted in a different combination of 
treatment and comparison cases being grouped together, perhaps in a different number of 
clusters.  This observation suggests that future research that uses this approach might test the 
sensitivity of various algorithms at the cluster analysis stage.  Nevertheless, as Lebart et al. 
(1984) mention, some of the greatest minds in Multivariate Statistical Analysis of the French 
School of Analyse des données, the efficacy of the method of classification around moving 
centers is largely attested to by empirical results and is the partitioning method that best 
accommodates large datasets like ours. 
 Related is the point that the selection of an optimal cluster solution also involves some 
subjectivity.  Although several reasonable solutions can be identified, the rationale for choosing 
one over another is not objective.  In fact, our selection of the 40-cluster solution was based on 
the rationale that it seemed like that solution retained enough of its cases to be useful; but as 
analysis continued, we observed that several of the resulting clusters had too few treatment cases 
to instill confidence.  This is another arena where this method might be subjected to further 
sensitivity testing 
 Despite these caveats, we believe this approach has promise.  It includes an improvement 
over conventional propensity score matching, which requires subjective judgment on model 
specification.  In contrast, our strategy groups each observation in the treatment group with those 
in the control group whose observed characteristics are similar; within balanced clusters, units 
are different only with respect to whether they received treatment.  In turn, estimated impacts are 
not biased in any systematic way.  Such a conclusion is enhanced by the observation that the GI 
measure is a global measure of comparability between groups, objective because it is based on 
the concept of variance observed in the data, among baseline covariates (considered 
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simultaneously) and the assignment-to-treatment indicator variable.  It is also enhanced by the 
use of the multivariate imbalance test that allows determining the imbalance’s significant, 
thereby overcoming standard variable-by-variable test of balance that can not consider 
interaction among variables.  This strategy is based on the assumption of “no omitted variable 
bias,” meaning that relevant variables involved in the selection process are known (Author3 & 
Author2, 2010).  Future work might also explore the sensitivity of the multivariate test of 
imbalance to specific failure of the unconfoundedness assumption. 
 This paper has taken a question – how does public assistance receipt affect charitable 
giving? – and applied a new, cluster-based approach to minimize bias that arises specifically in 
the selection-to-welfare process.  The preliminary substantive findings reported accord with prior 
research.  Specifically, we observe some evidence that public assistance suppresses money 
donations, in line with Brooks (2002, 2004) and Author4 & Author1 (2009).  Findings regarding 
volunteer hours are less clear, with evidence that there may be no effect (as in Author1 & 
Author4, 2011) or a positive effect (as in Author4 & Author1, 2009).  What is clear is that there 
is substantial heterogeneity within the population, and this heterogeneity demands an analytic 
approach that recognizes it, as we had done here, rather than on ignoring it and assessing only 
average treatment effects.  This work offers a useful application of a new method to capitalize on 
treatment group heterogeneity and minimize the effect of selection bias in computing treatment 
effects in non-experimental evaluations.
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APPENDIX A (See Author1, Author 3 & Author2, 2009) 
 This technical appendix explains the computation of the measure of Global Imbalance 
(GI) and the imbalance test we propose using to ascertain whether selection bias (1) poses a 
problem for an evaluation’s impact analysis and (2) has been eliminated from cluster subgroups. 
 
The GI Measure 
 Author2 (2009) and Author3 and Author2 (2010) report that the between-group inertia of 
a cloud of units denotes the GI measure expressed as: 
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 where  
  Q denotes the number of baseline covariates introduced in the analysis 
  T denotes the number of treatment levels; 
  QJ  denotes the set of all categories of the Q variables considered; 
  tjb is the number of units with category QJj  in the treatment group Tt ;  
  tk.  is the group size Tt ; and 
  jk.  is the number of units with category QJj . 
 The GI measure is the result of using Conditional MCA (Escofier, 1988) that allows 
quantifying the between-group inertia.  Such a measure originates from the consideration that 
when the dependence between X and T is out of control of researchers displaying the 
relationship among them on a factorial space represents a first step for discovering the hidden 
relationship.  In fact, if dependence between X and T exists, any descriptive factorial analysis 
may exhibit this link. 
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 A conventional method dealing with the factorial decomposition of the variance related to 
the juxtaposition of the X matrix and the T variable is Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) 
framework.
4
  Given that the variability (inertia) of a data matrix can be decomposed into 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors, and referring to MCA for the study of the relationship between 
variables and of the structure induced by variables on the population, the presence of a 
conditioning variable (T) will strongly influence the structure of the matrix decomposition 
process.  Hence, a conditional analysis could be useful in order to isolate the part of the 
variability of the X-space due to the assignment mechanism.  Conditioning applied to problems 
arising from the dependence between categorical covariates and an external categorical variable 
was first studied by Escofier (1988) with the resulting Conditional Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA_cond).  
 Referring to Huygens’ overall inertia decomposition of total inertia (
T
I ) as within-groups 
(
W
I ) and between-groups (
B
I ), MCA_cond consists in a factorial decomposition of the within-
group inertia.  In turn, MCA_cond could be also considered as an intra analysis since the inertia 
induced by the conditioning variable (T) is not taken into account.  Specifically, an inter-group 
analysis considers the relative position of groups, whereas an intra-group analysis detects and 
describes differences between units within each group by not considering the effect due to the 
partition’s structure.  In the evaluation context, this structure is induced by the non-random 
selection mechanism.  An intra-analysis allows measuring the influence of conditioning, which 
means, as reported in Author3 & Author2 (2010), obtaining a measure of comparability between 
treatment groups. 
                                                 
4
 For a comprehensive description of this method, computational details, and its applications, refer to Lebart et al. 
(1984), and for problems in the presence of a conditioning variable, refer to Author 3 and Author 2 (2010) and 
Author 2 and Author 3 (2011). 
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 This method especially works in the presence of categorical covariates.  Eventually, 
continuous variables could be transformed into categorical by dividing them in classes.  The 
need to work with categorical covariates stems from the consideration that, as reported in Cox 
and Wermuth (1998), in the social sciences, background knowledge tends to be qualitative. 
 The key result of using MCA_cond is represented by the quantified “Between-group 
Inertia” (
b
I ).  The no omitted variable bias assumption underlying the approach assumes a 
crucial role and, thus, must be emphasized.  The assignment mechanism is assumed to be known, 
which means that the X matrix includes all baseline variables associated with both the treatment 
assignment and the observed outcome. 
 
The Imbalance Test 
 To determine the significance of the detected imbalance, we perform an Imbalance test. 
We specify the null hypothesis of no dependence between X and T as: 
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To establish an interval of plausible values for 
B
I  under the null hypothesis, we use results 
obtained by Estadella and Aluja (2005), who have studied the asymptotic distribution function of 
B
I . Once derived the distribution of the between group inertia as 
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Specifically, if the GI calculated on the specific dataset is outside the interval, then the null 
hypothesis of no dependence between X and T is rejected and data are deemed unbalanced.  
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Simulation results show that where the test detects balance unbiased estimates of the ATE are 
obtained (Author2, 2009; Author3 & Author2, 2010). 
 
 
